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Abstract 
Federated Learning is a new distributed learning 
mechanism which allows model training on a large 
corpus of decentralized data owned by different 
data providers, without sharing or leakage of raw 
data. According to the characteristics of data dis-
tribution, it could be usually classified into three 
categories: horizontal federated learning, vertical 
federated learning, and federated transfer learning. 
In this paper we present a solution for parallel dis-
tributed logistic regression for vertical federated 
learning. As compared with existing works, the 
role of third-party coordinator is removed in our 
proposed solution. The system is built on the pa-
rameter server architecture and aims to speed up 
the model training via utilizing a cluster of servers 
in case of large volume of training data. We also 
evaluate the performance of the parallel distributed 
model training and the experimental results show 
the great scalability of the system. 
1 Introduction 
Due to its ability to extract knowledge and insights from 
massive data and transform data into business values, ma-
chine learning has been playing a very important role in 
various applications, including web search, online adver-
tisement, commodity recommendation, mechanical failure 
prediction, insurance pricing, and financial risk management, 
etc. Traditionally, a machine learning model is trained over 
a centralized corpus of data, which might be collected by a 
single or multiple data providers. Although parallel distrib-
uted algorithms have been developed to accelerate the 
training process, the training data themselves are still col-
lected and stored centrally in a data center. This way works 
well when the data are owned by a single data provider or 
when the data owned by multiple different data providers 
can be shared and merged together without violating laws 
and regulations. 
In some circumstances, there are some practical chal-
lenges to share and circulate data across different organiza-
tions. On the one hand, there exists risks of data abuse 
and/or secondary distribution of data once the data are 
shared to third parties. On the other hand, some kinds of 
data are forbidden to be circulated according to certain laws 
and regulations. How to train machine learning models un-
der these constraints raises a great challenge for both aca-
demic and industry communities. Federated learning pro-
vides a possible solution for tackling this challenge 
[McMahan and Ramage, 2017; Yang et al., 2019]. 
A few years ago, Google proposed a framework for fed-
erated learning which aims to enable model training on a 
large corpus of decentralized data residing on devices like 
smart phones which allows to both preserve data privacy 
and prevent data leakage [Konečný et al., 2016]]. The con-
cept of federated learning is extended by Yang et al. [2019] 
to cover more scenarios and forms a comprehensive secure 
federated learning framework, including horizontal federat-
ed learning (HFL), vertical federated learning (VFL), and 
federated transfer learning (FTL). HFL is also named sam-
ple-based federated learning, which is applicable to the sce-
narios that datasets owned by different parties share the 
same feature space but differ in samples.  VFL is also 
named feature-based federated learning, which is suited to 
the scenarios that datasets owned by different parties share 
the same sample ID space but differ in feature space. FTL is 
applicable to the scenarios that datasets owned by different 
parties differ not only in samples but also in feature space. 
 
 
Figure 1: Vertical federated learning with coordinator 
 
 
In this paper, we introduce a parallel distributed logistic 
regression implementation for vertical federated learning. 
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Due to its simplicity and wide usage in many binary classi-
fication tasks, there already exist several implementations of 
logistic regression for vertical federated learning [Hardy et 
al., 2017]. However, as Figure 1 shows, these existing im-
plementations are built on an architect that involves three 
parties: party A that has both part of features and labels of 
samples, party B that has only part of features, and party C 
that plays as a coordinator, which is very critical role and 
should be trusted by both party A and B. In our implemen-
tation, we propose to remove the party C, i.e. the coordina-
tor, from the system, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Vertical federated learning without coordinator 
 
 
The main reasons behind this change are two folds. First, 
it’s very difficult itself to find an authoritative third party 
that can be trusted by any two parties. Second, it increases 
the risk of data leakage by involving a third party besides 
the party A and B. By removing the party C, it can greatly 
reduce the complexity of the system and decrease the cost of 
building a joint model between any two parties. We will 
further discuss the security impact caused by this architec-
tural change. Moreover, in our implementation, we consider 
to build a parallel distributed system to speed up the training 
process in the case of very large volume of training data, 
instead of a system that runs in a single machine at each 
party. 
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) We propose a new architecture for vertical federated 
learning that removes the role of third-party coordi-
nator, which greatly reduces the complexity of the 
system and allows any two parties to train a joint 
model without the help of a trusted coordinator. 
2) We implement a parallel distributed logistic regres-
sion for vertical federated learning based on the 
above architecture, which can handle very large 
volume of training data by running the training al-
gorithm on a cluster of machines at each party. 
3) Besides the two-party model training, our proposed 
system architecture can also be easily extended to 
support multi-party model training. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we give a brief overview of related works. We present the 
details of our solution in Section 3. Experimental results and 
some analysis are given in Section 4. We conclude the paper 
in Section 5. 
2 Related Work 
This paper is related to federated learning (FL), a new ma-
chine learning mechanism that enables to train a joint model 
on a large corpus of decentralized data owned by different 
parties while preserving the data privacy. McMahan and 
Ramage [2017] described the application of FL in the sce-
nario of mobile devices, where the data reside on tens of 
millions of smart phones and the objective is to train a glob-
al model collaboratively by these devices on their local data. 
Konečný et al. [2016] studied the federated optimization 
problem for this setting where communication efficiency is 
of the utmost importance and minimizing the number of 
rounds of communication is the principal goal. Bonawitz et 
al. [2019] further presented a high-level design for scalable 
FL production system in the setting of mobile devices and 
discussed some challenges, solutions, and open problems in 
the system design. 
Yang et al. [2019] extended the concept of FL and cate-
gorized it into three classes according to the pattern of data 
distribution, including horizontal federated learning (HFL), 
vertical federated learning (VFL), and federated transfer 
learning (FTL). It also discussed more application domains 
of FL such as retail, finance, and healthcare, etc. 
This paper is also related to homomorphic encryption 
(HE) [Rivest et al., 1978; Paillier, 1999; Acar et al., 2018], a 
cryptographic method which is widely used in the priva-
cy-preserving machine learning algorithms. HE allows 
computation on encrypted data and the result of such a 
computation remains encrypted. When decrypted, it matches 
the result of the computation performed on the plaintext. 
There are several different types of homomorphic encryp-
tion, e.g. fully homomorphic, and partially homomorphic. 
Among others, additively homomorphic encryption (AHE) 
is the one which is most commonly used due to its relatively 
superior computation efficiency. Let the encryption of a 
number u be 𝑢 , given any numbers u, v, and n in plaintext, 
we have: 
 
  𝒖 + 𝒗 = 𝒖 + 𝒗  (1) 
  𝒏 ∙ 𝒖 = 𝒏 ∙ 𝒖  (2) 
 
In some recent works, raw data from different parties are 
encrypted with AHE and then uploaded to a central server 
(e.g. a cloud host), and models are learned over the en-
crypted data by running machine learning algorithms 
adapted for AHE [Aono et al., 2016; Yuan and Yu, 2014]. 
In this way it could protect the raw data and achieve some 
kind of data privacy but doing arithmetic on encrypted data 
comes at a cost both in memory and processing time. And 
the data, although encrypted, cannot be kept locally, thus it 
raises potential risk of data leakage. 
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Instead of transmitting encrypted data to a central server, 
some intermediate results could be encrypted with AHE and 
transmitted during the training process. This brings some 
significant advantages: 1) the raw data are kept locally by 
each party, and 2) the amount of data to be encrypted is 
minimized through careful design, thus 3) the overall com-
putation overhead could be reduced greatly. In this research 
direction, Hardy et al. [2017] proposed a solution for feder-
ated logistic regression on vertically partitioned data. Our 
work is another endeavor in this direction and we present a 
new solution for vertical federated logistic regression in this 
paper. 
 As compared with [Hardy et al., 2017], our solution is 
different in the following three perspectives. First, we adopt 
an architecture that removes the third-party coordinator, 
which can greatly simplify the system deployment. Second, 
we keep the loss function unchanged, instead of approxi-
mating it with a polynomial. Third, we aim to handle very 
large datasets and our solution is designed purposefully to 
be parallel distributed and scalable. 
3 Solution 
3.1 Overview of Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is a widely used machine learning model. 
In its basic form, it uses a logistic function to model 
a binary dependent variable, as described below: 
  𝑷 𝒚 = 𝟏 𝒙;𝚯 = 𝒉𝚯 𝒙 = 𝟏𝟏!𝒆!𝚯𝒙 (3) 
In the setting of vertical federated learning of two parties 
A and B, assuming two datasets {𝑥!!|𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!} , {𝑥!! , 𝑦!|𝑖 ∈𝐷! , 𝑦! ∈ {0,1}} , and model parameters Θ! , Θ!  corre-
sponding to the feature space of 𝑥!, 𝑥! , respectively, the 
training objective is: 𝑳 = − 𝟏𝒏 𝒚𝒊 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝒉𝚯(𝒙𝒊) + 𝟏 − 𝒚𝒊 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝟏 − 𝒉𝚯 𝒙𝒊 )𝒏𝒊!𝟏 (4) 
And the gradients are: 
  𝝏𝑳𝝏𝚯 = − 𝟏𝒏 (𝒚𝒊 − 𝒉𝚯 𝒙𝒊 )𝒙𝒊𝒏𝒊!𝟏  (5) 
 
And Θ𝑥 , the linear predictor, can be written as: 
  𝚯𝒙 = 𝚯𝑨𝒙𝑨 + 𝚯𝑩𝒙𝑩 (6) 
3.2 Protocol of Model Training 
To train a federated logistic regression model, we need to 
protect both the raw data, i.e. 𝑥!,  𝑥!, and 𝑦, and model, i.e. Θ! and Θ!, as summarized in Table 1. These data are stored 
locally by each party and are forbidden to be transmitted. 
It’s also expected that these data will not be learned by oth-
ers from any intermediate data transmitted during the model 
training. 
 
 Data to be protected and stored locally 
Party A 𝑥!, Θ!, 𝑦 
Party B 𝑥!, Θ!  
 
Table 1: Data privacy 
 
Table 2 shows the main steps of our proposed federated 
logistic regression training process. In practice, when train-
ing a model over a dataset, Step 2 to Step 6 will be usually 
iterated a lot of times until a maximum iteration number is 
reached or some convergence conditions are satisfied. Note 
that some intermediate data are exchanged but no data listed 
in Table 1 is transmitted between two parties during the 
model training. The major steps which involves intermedi-
ate data exchange that might lead to potential data leakage 
are listed below: 
1) In Step 2, B sends Θ!!𝑥!! in plaintext to A for each in-
stance.  
2) In Step 3, A sends (𝑦! − 𝑦!)  to B. 
3) In Step 4, B sends !"!!! + 𝑅!  to A, where 𝑅!  
are encrypted random masks to avoid A to learn the 
gradients of B. 
The intermediate data exchanged during the model train-
ing are summarized in Table 3. We will further discuss the 
security of the model training protocol later in Section 3.4. 
 
 
 Party A Party B 
Step 0 Create an encryption key pair, and send the public key to B  
Step 1 Initialize Θ! Initialize Θ! 
Step 2 Compute Θ!𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! Compute Θ!𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!  and send them to A 
Step 3 Compute Θ𝑥! = Θ!𝑥!! + Θ!𝑥!! , 𝑦! = ℎ! 𝑥! , (𝑦! − 𝑦!) , 
and send (𝑦! − 𝑦!)  to B for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!  
Step 4 Compute !"!!! and the loss L Compute !"!!! , generate random number 𝑅!, 
and send  !"!!! + 𝑅!   to A 
Step 5 Decrypt  !"!!! + 𝑅! , and send !"!!! + 𝑅! to B  
Step 6 Update Θ! Update Θ! 
 
Table 2: Model training protocol of logistic regression for vertical federated learning 
  
 
 Intermediate results to be transmitted 
Party A 𝑦! − 𝑦!  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! 
Party B Θ!𝑥!!  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! , !"!!! + 𝑅!  for 
each feature 
 
Table 3: Intermediate data exchange 
3.3  System Architecture 
We aim to build a parallel distributed system that can be 
deployed in real-world production systems to handle very 
large corpus of data very efficiently. Figure 3 shows the 
system architecture of our proposed solution. For each party, 
it adopts a worker-parameter server architecture, where 
there is a centralized parameter server and a set of worker 
nodes. There are no connections between worker nodes and 
the worker node can only communicate with its corre-
sponding parameter server. The only communication chan-
nel between the party A and B exists between their corre-
sponding parameter servers. 
 
 
Figure 3: System architecture 
 
The worker-parameter server architecture in our imple-
mentation is adapted from the open-sourced ps-lite1 project. 
The communication between parameter servers is also built 
on brpc2, a well-known open-sourced library for RPC. For 
secure intermediate results exchange, we utilize libpaillier3 
to implement additively homomorphic encryption. And 
most of codes are written in C++. 
3.4 Security Analysis 
In this Section, we analyze the security of the training pro-
tocol shown in Table 2.  
Security of A’s label data. Let’s check whether B can 
learn 𝑦! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. Note that if B can learn the residuals (𝑦! − 𝑦!) for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!, it can then learn the labels 𝑦! 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! 
because the residual will be negative if 𝑦! = 0 and positive 
                         
1https://github.com/dmlc/ps-lite 
2https://github.com/apache/incubator-brpc 
3
http://acsc.cs.utexas.edu/libpaillier/ 
otherwise. We can find that in each iteration, only Step 3 
and Step 5 involves transmitting data from A to B. In Step 3, 
the encrypted residuals (𝑦! − 𝑦!)  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! are transmit-
ted. Because the party B only has the public key, it cannot 
decrypt the encrypted residuals. In Step 5, the randomly 
masked gradients of B,  !"!!! + 𝑅! , are transmitted, from 
which B can restore its gradients. From equation (5) we can 
find that the gradients are computed as a linear combination 
of residuals. Assuming that B has n instances and m features, 
we can get m linear combinations of n residuals. When 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛, these residuals can be learned by solving the sys-
tems of linear equations. 
Security of B’s private data. Let’s check whether A can 
learn 𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. In each iteration, only Step 2 and Step 4 
involves transmitting data from B to A. In Step 2, B sends Θ!𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! to A. From these transmitted values A can 
construct n equations of Θ! and 𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! where there 
are (𝑛 + 1)×𝑚  unknowns. Note that both Θ!  and 𝑥!!  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! are unknown to A, and B has n instances and m fea-
tures. It’s obvious the system of equations cannot be solved 
because 𝑛 < (𝑛 + 1)×𝑚. If the steps are iterated one more 
time, A can get another n equations. Meanwhile, A also gets 
m new unknowns because Θ! has been changed after each 
iteration. If the steps are iterated r rounds, A will get a total 
of 𝑛×𝑟  equations where there are (𝑛 + 𝑟)×𝑚  unknowns. 
When 𝑛 > 𝑚 and 𝑟 ≥ !×!!!!, these unknowns can be learned 
by solving the system of equations. 
In Step 4, B sends !"!𝚯! + 𝑅!  to A. A can construct m 
equations of  𝑅!  and 𝑥!!  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!  where there are (𝑛 + 1)×𝑚 unknowns. It’s obvious that the system of equa-
tions cannot be solved because 𝑚 < (𝑛 + 1)×𝑚 . If the 
steps are iterated r rounds, A will get a total of 𝑚×𝑟 equa-
tions and there will be (𝑛 + 𝑟)×𝑚 unknowns. It’s also ob-
vious that the system of equations cannot be solved. Note 
that if the encrypted gradients are not masked with random 
numbers, A can learn 𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! after n rounds. 
Security of A’s feature data. Third, let’s check whether 
B can learn 𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. As analyzed above, B can learn 
the residuals (𝑦! − 𝑦!) for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! in some circumstances and 
further learn 𝑦! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. As a result, B will also learn 𝑦! 
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷! and further learn Θ!𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. Starting from 
here, we can apply the similar analysis logic discussed 
above to conclude that there are some circumstances where 
B can learn both Θ! and 𝑥!! for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷!. 
In the above analysis, we assume that both A and B are 
honest but curious. In the case that A is malicious, it can 
also learn 𝑥!! one by one by setting all residuals to zero ex-
cept one. To sum up, we can conclude that our solution is 
secure in practice through careful boundary condition 
checking.  
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4 Experiments 
In this Section, we evaluate the performance of our solution 
through experiments from the perspectives of correctness, 
efficiency, and scalability. 
4.1 Settings 
Datasets. We evaluated the performance of our parallel 
distributed logistic regression for vertical federated learning 
over two datasets: Mnist4 and Citeseer5. Table 2 describes 
some basic information about these two datasets. Note that 
Mnist is comprised of handwritten digits of 0 to 9 for mul-
ti-class classification. In the following experiments, we 
transform it to be suitable for binary classification: odd vs. 
even digits. Citeseer itself is a dataset for binary classifica-
tion. It’s very sparse and there are only 512,267 non-zero 
feature values. It’s also highly skewed. 
 
Name # Rows # Cols IsDense 
Mnist 70,000 784 Yes 
Citeseer 181,395 105,354 No 
 
Table 4: A brief description of datasets 
 
Environments. The experiments are executed on Baidu 
cloud6. Each machine in our experiments has 16 CPU cores 
and 64 GB RAM. We allocate such a machine for each pa-
rameter server and each worker node. And in each experi-
ment, one parameter server and multiple worker nodes are 
deployed for each party. The machines allocated for each 
party are hosted in the same region of Baidu cloud. The 
time-consuming computation is executed via mul-
ti-threading and the number of threads is set to 8 in the fol-
lowing experiments. 
4.2 Results 
In this Section we present the experimental results. Table 5 
shows the AUC of learned modes on Minist and Citeseer 
dataset. The convergence curve of AUC on Citeseer dataset 
is shown in Figure 4. And Figure 5 shows the scalability of 
the system and speedup on Citesser dataset with the increase 
of worker nodes. Note that because the Mnist dataset is rela-
tively small and the training process is very fast even in 
single worker node, we did not perform the scalability ex-
periment over the dataset.  
The experimental results show that: 1) the learned models 
have excellent performance as measured by AUC; 2) the 
model quickly converges to a steady status after a number of 
iterations; and 3) the system is scalable and has sub-linear 
speedup. Besides, the overall running time is comparable 
with the traditional implementation of logistic regression. It 
proves that the system is suitable to be deployed in produc-
                         
4http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/ 
5 http://komarix.org/ac/ds/J_Lee.txt.bz2 
6 https://cloud.baidu.com/ 
 
tion system for handling vertical federated learning on very 
large corpus of decentralized data. 
We also find some problems that might be the perfor-
mance bottlenecks and we will fix these problems in near 
future. For example, we find that the training time can be 
further reduced if we offload some computations from pa-
rameter server to worker nodes. 
 
 Train AUC Test AUC 
Mnist 0.95 0.95 
Citeseer 0.99 0.89 
 
Table 5: AUC of learned models 
 
 
 
Figure 4: AUC Convergence on Citeseer dataset 
 
Figure 5: Scalability and speedup on Citeseer dataset 
 
5 Conclusions 
Federated learning is becoming a hotspot in machine learn-
ing community due to its ability to allow secure and effi-
cient joint model training on a large corpus of decentralized 
data. In this paper, we present a solution for parallel distrib-
uted logistic regression for vertical federated learning. Dif-
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ferent with existing solutions, we remove the role of 
third-party coordinator from the system and allow any two 
parties to run federated logistic regression directly. This 
system design brings some significant advantages, e.g. 
avoiding the practical difficulty to find an authoritative 
third-party coordinator that can be trusted by all participants, 
and reducing the complexity of system deployment, etc. We 
also evaluated our implementation over two datasets (a 
sparse one and a dense one) and the experimental results 
show the great efficiency and scalability of the system. 
Moreover, our implementation can be easily extended to 
support the joint model training of multiple parities. In fu-
ture, we will study the combination of logistic regression 
and deep neural network (DNN) for vertical federated 
learning. The basic idea is to learn hidden features from the 
input data with the help of DNN and feed them to the final 
logistic layer. 
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